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Guns for gold:the Wagner Network Exposed

Conclusions and recommendations


A decade of entrenching Russian interests abroad

1. The Wagner Network is a collection of individuals and entities linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin and undertaking military, economic, political and influencing operations internationally. It formed in 2014 and began its military activities in Ukraine, where it has had sustained involvement. The network subsequently expanded to several other countries in Africa and the Middle East. It has undertaken offensive military operations in at least seven countries since 2014: Ukraine; Syria; the Central African Republic (CAR); Sudan; Libya; Mozambique; and Mali. There are 10 further countries where we have medium or high confidence that it has been involved in a non-military capacity since 2014, and many more countries where the network’s presence is rumoured. (Paragraph 13)

2. The Wagner Network is highly opportunistic and not a straightforward proxy for Russia, even though the Russian state has sometimes directed, facilitated, and supported its military operations, notably in Libya and Ukraine. Even when the network has acted purely in its own economic interests, Russia is likely to have benefited financially or in geopolitical influence from its presence. Its guiding hand has been the Russian state. (Paragraph 15)

3. Host governments and other non-regime actors must perceive benefits from engaging with the Wagner Network, because they consider it the most effective form of protection and security. There are examples of its fighters furthering a regime’s security objectives, even if this meant neutering political opposition. (Paragraph 17)

4. There is a significant gap between perception and capability when it comes to the Wagner Network. Despite the continued belief by some that inviting them into a country will result in benefits, the reality is that regimes pay a high price for working with the Wagner Network. The original outcomes are rarely achieved. During the past 10 years, Wagner fighters have left behind a trail of atrocities in virtually all theatres where they have operated, with limited accountability. They may present themselves as a highly trained, professional fighting force but their indiscipline, their excessive violence and their financial motivation mean that the network has functioned like an international criminal mafia, fuelling corruption and plundering natural resources. Some regimes’ reliance on the network for survival means that Wagner actors show little respect for the citizens or the laws of the countries where they operate. The network’s military and political involvement in the Central African Republic is all-encompassing and should serve as a warning of what may happen elsewhere. Even when Wagner’s deployments do not result in benefits for the host country, they are often a great success for the network itself due to the lucrative resources it accesses, particularly in the Central African Republic and Sudan. (Paragraph 25)

5. There are serious national security threats to the UK and its allies of allowing the network to continue to thrive, not to mention devastating human consequences, including contributing to the refugee crisis for example, Sudan. (Paragraph 30)