29
He discusses these two points and then sums up the military aspect of the case:—"The Tunnel may be a foolish venture. It may never be completed, it may, even if completed, be financially a failure; it may not realise any of the objects intended. On all these points I do not care to give an opinion, but as to its dangers in a military sense, and with the most ordinary precautions, I am unable to perceive them. The invention of steam as a motive power for ships, and the creation of large harbours on the French coast, are more serious matters for us in a military point of view than any amount of Tunnels are likely to be" (p. 219).
(2.)—Evidence before Mr. Farrer's Committee.
"The first thing that you would do would be to take up a few rails at as many places as you liked, which would at once stop the traffic" (p. 227).
"A few men resorting to treachery would not suffice; but if you are to suppose such a thing possible" (that the mouth of the Tunnel has been seized by a very considerable body of men) "I should not be alarmed, because I should then blow up the Tunnel" (p. 228).
(3.)—2nd Memorandum:—
"The means of obstruction, in short, are not only various, but are independent of each other, and many of them could be improvised or multiplied even at the last moment. Nothing, indeed is more obvious than the facility with which the Tunnel can be denied to an enemy, by means which no vigilance on his part could prevent or remove" (p. 270).
Lord Richard Grosvenor, M.P.
Evidence before Sir A. Alison's Committee.
Speaking as chairman of the Channel Tunnel Company, he says:—"We flatter ourselves that from a strategical point of view, we have succeeded in two particulars (but that, of course, the Committee are the best judges of): that our exit will be defended by the guns of the Castle; that communication can be
