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(3.)—2nd Memorandum:—This is of great length from page 271 to 298, but as I have already quoted, I hope sufficiently for my purpose of Lord Wolseley's valuable opinion, I will only give a short summary from p. xvi. of the Précis, and the concluding paragraph of this Memorandum on the question of panics—"In spite of all precautions, our end of the Tunnel could be seized by a coup de main. The improved harbours on the French coast would make a surprise more easy. Surprises during peace were the common-places of history. The Tunnel would directly tempt invasion—it would be the most unassailable line of communications in the world. The successful invasion of England, with the Tunnel in the enemy's hands, would be the permanent ruin of the country. Neither fortifications nor scientific agencies could be trusted. It would be impossible to keep secret any military arrangements connected with mines. The danger of the Tunnel would be an increasing one, because, as time went on, the precautions would be neglected. Why should a new danger be added to those which already existed? From the commercial aspect, even a shadow of danger would be a heavy balance against any possible advantages. The liabilities to panics would be increased," He says in conclusion:—"We hear much of the panic-monger in the writings of those who favour the construction of this Tunnel. But who is the real panic-monger? Is it he who would have us create a work that must be the prolific parent of panics, or is it the man who strives to warn his countrymen against such an error?" (p. 298).


H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge.

Observations:—These extend from page 299 to 305, which I shall give as condensed in the Précis or Summary, p. xvi.

"His Royal Highness The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief could not too strongly express his satisfaction that the country was in no way committed to any definite engagement either to France or to any body of promoters. There was a large concensus of military opinion, which found expression in the evidence of the Adjutant-General before the Board of Trade