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pleasures to such a degree that he is powerless to act according to his highest instincts, do you consider him to be free?' 'By no means,' said Euthydemus. 'For, probably acting in the best possible way appears to you to constitute freedom, and the being under the control of influences that prevent one's so acting you regard as an indication of want of freedom' 'Certainly,' replied Euthydemus. 'The intemperate, then, appear to you to be, in every respect, as people who are without freedom?' 'Yes, by Jupiter,' exclaimed Euthydemus, 'and naturally so.' 'And do the intemperate seem to you merely to be prevented from acting in the best possible way, or to be forced to do those things that are most disgraceful?' 'They appear to me,' replied he, 'to be no less compelled to do the one than they are prevented from doing the other.' 'And what do you think of those masters who prevent men from doing what is best for them, and coerce them into doing that which is most injurious?' 'That they are the worst masters possible.' 'And what sort of slavery do you consider the most grievous?' 'That,' said he, 'under the worst masters.' 'And do not the intemperate suffer the most grievous kind of bondage?' 'So it appears to me,' answered the other. 'And does not intemperance, by repelling men from wisdom, which is their chief good, seem to you to precipitate them into its opposite evil? Does it not, likewise, appear to you in reference to what is useful to them, that it hinders them from acquiring a knowledge of it by seducing them to pleasure, and frequently, by diverting from their duty even those who know the difference between good and evil, lead them to prefer the worse to the better course?' 'That is certainly the case,' replied Euthydemus. 'And of whom can it be predicated that he is less under the influence of sobriety of mind than it can of the intemperate man? for, I take it that the actions resulting from sobriety and intemperance are diametrically opposite to each other.' 'I assent to this proposition also,' said Euthydemus. 'And do you consider that there is anything which makes men disregard everything that is decorous more completely than intemperance?' 'I do not, indeed,' replied he. 'And do you think anything can be worse for a man than that which induces him to select such things as are hurtful to him in preference to those which are beneficial, which prompts him to court the one and neglect the other, and which urges him on to a course totally opposite to that which is pursued by the sober-minded?' 'I do not think anything can be worse,' said Euthydemus. 'Is it not probable, therefore,' continued Socrates, 'that temperance will produce in men effects just the reverse of those which are produced by intemperance?' 'Certainly,' replied the other. 'Is it not probable, then, that such habits as produce those contrary effects would be most beneficial to a man?' 'It is so, Socrates,' said he. 'And have you ever reflected upon this fact, Euthydemus?' 'Upon what fact?' asked the latter. 'That intemperance does not actually lead men to those pleasures to which