strong if not a great ruler, had he not been the slave of sensuality. Though he was a king, he wanted the resolution to act as one.'
Afterwards he states: —
'In the year 1843, and again in 1844, the Sikh army actually left Lahore with the declared purpose of invading the British provinces.'
He thus points out the impossibility, owing to our numerical military weakness, of annexing the Punjab after Sobráon, and the advantage of assigning Kashmír to Ghuláb Singh: —
'Lord Hardinge had not the means for annexation, had he desired it. It was necessary to punish and weaken the invader without, if possible, destroying his political vitality. To lessen his power for mischief by dividing his territory was the only alternative; nor, in doing so, would it have been practicable to have annexed the Hill Provinces, adding the upper half of it to the British dominions. A position so isolated and difficult of access could only have been held by means of a chain of strong military posts. The ruinous expense of such a measure is the most conclusive argument against it. Would those again who clamour against handing over the Hill Territory to Ghuláb Singh have approved of annexing the Lower Provinces to the British dominions, thus fastening the more cruel and distasteful rule of the Sikhs upon the mountain tribes; or would those who urge the danger of the neighbourhood of the Sikhs, even now that their army is dispersed, have listened with complacency to a proposition which would have given them so advantageous a position of annoyance as the possession of the mountain ranges which bound the plains of the Punjab?'
