^6 S//^ THOMAS MUNRO
good, are few ; and though not defended by forti- fications, there are so many strong posts near them, that an invading army must either take them, which might require a whole campaign, or else leave them in the rear, and run the risk of being starved by the loss of its convoys. These are, no doubt, great advantages ; but because greater might have been with ease obtained, I cannot help thinking but that some- thing has been left und one. Why, instead of stumbling upon revenue accounts, could we not have traced our boundary on the map, taken such places as suited us from their political situation, sent him entirely above the Ghats, and not left him in possession of Karur and Coimbatore, to plunder our southern provinces whenever he shall find it convenient to go to war % ' It is true, that the possession of Palgatcherry will make it always easy for a Bombay army to take Coimbatore, and force him above the Ghats, with the assistance of a Karnatik army ; but to collect our troops is a work of some months, and in that time he may pass Trichinopoli, and ravage the Karnatik as far as Madras ; whilst, by driving off* the cattle and inhabitants, he may render it difficult for us to equip an army for the field. If we are in a situation to march, he will probably lose Bangalore in the first campaign. But he will always be able to prevent an army without cavalry from besieging Seringapatam ; and while he can do this, he can force us, after an ex- pensive war, to relinquish our conquests for peace. We ought, therefore, to have kept Coimbatore, and estab-
