me certain important facts (for statement of which I refer to his report) he had discovered as to the nature of the ground and of the defences. These facts, together with Early's withdrawal, of which I had been officially informed, and the increased darkness, convinced me that it would be a useless sacrifice of life to go on, and a recall was ordered. But instead of falling back to the original line, I caused the front line to assume a strong position in the plain to the right of the town, along the hollow of an old road bed. This position was much nearer the enemy, was clear of the town, and was one from which I could readily attack without confusion. The second line was placed in the position originally held by the first. Everything was gotten ready to attack at daylight; but a short time after assuming this new position, I was ordered to send, without delay, all the troops I could spare, without destroying my ability to hold my position, to reinforce Major-General Johnson. As my front line was much more strongly posted than my second, and was fully competent to hold the position, and as the reinforcements had to be in position before daylight, I was compelled to send to General Johnson the troops of my second line—i.e., the brigades of Daniel and O'Neal (excepting the Fifth Alabama). These brigades participated in the engagement on the left, under General Johnson, and remained under his orders until the following night, when our whole corps changed front to rear, so as to extend the line occupied by the other two corps. For a report of their operations on the third July, I have, therefore, to refer respectfully to the report of General Johnson, and to those of General Daniel and Colonel O'Neal, herewith filed.
This order left me powerless to do more than hold my position, unless the enemy should be very much weakened in my front, for I had now remaining but a single thin line, composed of two small brigades, about the third of another, and one regiment the Fifth Alabama, of O'Neal's brigade—in all not over 1,800 men facing what I believed then, and now, to be the most impregnable portion of the enemy's line of entrenchments. The gallant men and officers of this line held their new position all day on the 3d July, under a sharp and incessant fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, and an occasional artillery fire. The enemy made during the day several ineffectual efforts, by advancing heavy lines of skirmishers, equal almost, if not fully, to my main line and using their artillery to dislodge them from their position.
On the 3d, my orders were general, and the same as those of the
