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Southern Historical Society Papers.

the Grand Duke Nicholas, or under like circumstances, the Sublime Porte have tied himself up to Osman Pasha, the hero of Plevna. The truth is, General Lee and his army were full of fight, their "objective point" was the Federal army of the Potomac, and "those people" the Confederate chief had resolved to strike whenever and wherever the best opportunity occurred, "strategically offensive and tactically defensive," to the contrary notwithstanding. An army of invasion is naturally an offensive one in strategy and tactics, and history rarely points to an instance where it has been concentrated on a given point to patiently await an attack. The distance from its base making supplies a difficult matter to procure, in itself regulates the whole question.

An army so situated must move or fight. The absurdity of Longstreet's statement is shown in admitting the presumption, General Lee knew all this; nor can we reconcile with the facts of the case General Longstreet's expression, wherein he says that his paper in the Times is called out by the fact that he has "been so repeatedly and rancorously assailed by those whose intimacy with the Commanding-General, in that battle, gives an importance to their assaults."

His communications just after the war to Mr. Swinton, the historian, were in substance the same attack upon General Lee which he has repeated in this paper. It was, therefore, in him, and came out before any of the utterances now complained of were made. The official reports of Generals Ewell, Early, and Pendleton, written soon after the battle, clearly stated it was well understood and expected that General Longstreet would make the main attack early in the morning of the 2nd of July.

If these reports furnished the "sly under-current of misrepresentation" of his course, why did he not ask his chief to correct their statements, and set him right upon the record? His revelations, if accepted now, would greatly injure the military reputations of Generals Lee, Ewell, and Hill. Alas! not one of whom live, for history's sake, to defend their stainless fame.

I propose to show, first, it was General Lee's intention to attack at sunrise or as soon as possible thereafter; second, the probable result of such an attack promptly made at an early hour, and, third, to examine the statement that General Longstreet had a plan to fight the battle different from General Lee's, which plan General Lee has since said would have been successful if adopted.