of the ground on the right was intersected by a pond ten feet deep and a mile long, and General Walker's comment upon the man's idea of military obstacles. At this time the troops, impeded and delayed on their long march by matters mentioned hereafter, had not yet come up, and regret and annoyance were expressed by all parties at the delay.
Hardee's line of battle was formed on a road leading from the Atlanta and McDonough road northeastward towards Decatur, and was in rear of the left of and at an angle of about forty-five degrees with McPherson's entrenched line; so that the left divisions should strike the left flank and rear of the Seventeenth corps, and the right divisions in turn should reach the rear of the Fifteenth corps, on the extension of McPherson's line northward. The advance in line was over a rough and broken country, intersected on the right by swamps and sloughs, and especially on the left was for some mile and a half or two miles through a wilderness of scant undergrowth so dense that it was next to impossible to preserve distance, direction or the proper angle of approach. General Hardee says of it, in a letter written next day: "I marched in line for two miles through a dense forest, where I could not see ten paces. Of course it was impossible to keep up an alignment." And Lowry, in his official report, says he could not see a hundred yards of his own line at a time, and "that a line of battle could not be seen fifty yards."
A part of the left wing—Cleburne and Maney—struck the works which McPherson had thrown back on a line perpendicular to his main line, for the protection of his rear, and doubled up this flank, while another part turned and took the main entrenched line in reserve. These entrenchments were so constructed as to be formidable, whether attacked in front or rear. General Wheeler, who examined them that night after they had been taken, and while they were held by our troops, says of them: "I was surprised to find them so deep that they formed a good protection for the occupants from the rear."
Meanwhile the right divisions—Bate and Walker—unexpectedly encountered the Sixteenth corps, a contingency unprovided for in General Hood's plan of attack. This corps had been crowded out of position by the contraction of the line of investment, and was destined by General Sherman to the work of breaking up the railroad, but had now been ordered up from its detached service, and was on the march to Atlanta, and accidentally in the position where
