"Cleburne . . . thereupon informed me that as his division was about to move forward to the attack on the 20th, General Hardee rode along the line, and in the presence of those around him, cautioned him to be on the lookout for breastworks."
"I can recall no reply on my part, at the time, save, perhaps, some expression of astonishment. I could say nothing to even so worthy a subordinate. He left me to infer, however, from subsequent remarks that his division would have taken quite a different action on the 21st, had it not been for the forewarning of his corps commander." . . .
The author adds:
"It is but reasonable to deduce from this unfortunate observation to Cleburne, that General Hardee gave a similar warning to other officers; at all events, those who are able to realize the baneful effects of such a remark from the commander of corps d'armee, upon the eve of conflict, know that his words were almost equivalent to an order to take no active part in the battle."
And this aspersion is studiously interwoven throughout the text as a fact, and as accounting, in a large measure, for the failure of the successive operations around Atlanta. It first sees the light fifteen years after the alleged occurrence, and when the lips of Hardee and Cleburne, who alone could have directly refuted it, have long since been sealed in death. It is made against Hardee, whom his worst enemy would concede to be instinct with high soldierly impulses, and is attributed to Cleburne, who, of all the thousands that served under Hardee during the war, was, perhaps, his most devoted friend.
That in the Dalton and Atlanta campaign, where breastworks were so prominent a feature on both sides, they should often have been the subject of discussion or remark among officers, from the Commanding-General down, is quite likely; but nothing which might have been said on that or any subject by such a soldier as Hardee to such a soldier as Cleburne, could possibly have been misconstrued or have worked evil; and Hardee and Cleburne lived to little purpose, if any, not saturated with passion and prejudice, could for an instant believe either that Hardee was capable of riding along his lines and warning his troops against the breastworks they were about to assault, or that Cleburne was capable of making such an imputation against him. And to the veteran survivorhood of that army, who had so many opportunities of seeing Hardee on the field of battle, handling and moving troops in action, this charge, taken with its intendments, is so utterly