First Maryland Campaign. 103
— but that the Confederate army ought to have yielded the moral effects of victory without further struggle by retiring at once to the south side of the Potomac. After defending General D. H. Hill from some imaginary assailant for the loss of the captured dispatch, he adopts, more or less, General Hill's idiosyncrasy in regard to the value of that dispatch to McClellan and its effect upon the fortunes of the campaign. He thinks it did McClellan little good, and that it contributed in no considerable degree to General Lee's failure. The animus of the article is unfair to the Confederate leader, but makes up for this by being very complimentary to General Long- street himself.
If the author looks back with distorted vision upon Lee and his deeds in this campaign, his bile is evidently deeply stirred when the vision of Jackson passes before his mind. Speaking of the results of the campaign, he says : "Jackson was quite satisfied with the campaign, as the Virginia papers made him the hero of Harper's Ferry, although the greater danger was with McLaws, and his was the severer and more important service." Again: "Jackson made a wide, sweeping march around the Ferry, passing the Potomac at Williamsport, and moving from there on towards Martinsburg, and turning thence upon Harper's Ferry to make his attack by Bolivar Heights. McLaws made a hurried march to reach Maryland Heights before Jackson could get into position, and succeeded in doing so. With Maryland Heights in our possession the Federals could not hold their position there. McLaws put two or three hundred men to each piece of his artillery, and carried it up the Heights, and was in position before Jackson came on the Heights opposite. Simultaneously Walker appeared upon Loudoun Heights, south of the Potomac and east of the Shenandoah, thus completing the combination against the Fede- ral garrison." In the description of the battle of Sharpsburg but a very meagre allusion is made to the tremendous struggle which took place on Jackson's line, and which was the heaviest attack made by McClellan during the day ; and only the obscurest mention is made of the magnificent blow struck by A. P. Hill in the afternoon, which relieved Longstreet's own line from overwhelming pressure, and sent Burnside's corps broken and bleeding back to the Antietam.
The purpose and plans of this Maryland campaign are not hard to understand. Lee had just defeated one-half of the Federal troops in Virginia, and driven them to the fortifications of Washington. He could not get at his foe in that position, and to remain idle at Manas- sas was to give the enemy an opportunity to recover from the blow
