212 Southern Historical Society Papers.
its entire numerical strength at the commencement of the campaign.* So that if we suppose the two armies starting out on the campaign with equal numbers, Grant would have had no army left after the bat- tle of Cold Harbor on the 3d June. Within one month Lee would have entirely destroyed it. But there was, nevertheless, much truth in Colonel Gordon's remark. Our system of battle required too much exposure of our officers. Our officers had to lead rather than to direct. It was example and not order so much by which our troops were guided. And undoubtedly it was fearfully expensive in officers. Again and again regiments, and sometimes even brigades, came out of battle under subalterns Had our men been better drilled many valuable officers might have been spared to have devised, guided and directed subsequent battles.
A distinguished Federal officer, who has frequently discussed this matter with me, hdS constantly maintained that in fact the troops of our army were better disciplined than their' s. It is certain that our army on no occasion suffered from panic, or was routed as the Fed- eral army in both the battles on Manassas Plains in i86i and '62, and at Chancellorsville.
Our system of recruiting was certainly wiser than that of the Fed-
- Swinton says : " Grant's loss in the series of actions from the Wilderness
to the Chickahominy reached the enormous aggregate of sixty thousand men put hors de combat — a number greater than the entire strength of Lee's army at the opening of the campaign. He had inflicted on Lee a loss of twenty thousand— the ratio being three to one. The Confederates, elated at the skillful manner in which they had constantly, been thrust between Richmond and the Union army, and conscious of the terrible price in blood they had exacted from the latter, were in high spirit, and the morale of Lee's army was never better than after-the battle of Cold Har- bor." See Army of the Potomac, Swinton, pages 491, 492. Four Years with General Lee, Taylor, page 135. Southern Historical Papers, General C. M. Wilcox, page 75.
Hut General Humphreys, in his Virp;inia Campaign of '64 and '65, puttingj our forces at 61,953 at the commencement of the campaign (page 17), gives the Federal losses as follows: Wilderness (page 53), 15,387; Spotsylvania (page 116), 17,723; North Anna (page 133), 2,100; Cold Harbor (page 191),] 12,970; total, 48,180.
True, Lee had received reinforcements at Hanover, which Generall Humphreys estimates at 8,700 muskets and 600 officers (page 125). But h< admUs that before Lee had received these reinforcements, with an army o^ 6',953 "len, he had inflicted a loss upon the enemy of 33,100. Is that not enough for the vindication of Lee's strategy and of his army's skill andj discipline ?
