98 Southern Historical Society Papers.
withdrew him from the fight. It was only when Jackson found that McClellan was not being driven from his works that he put into the battle every man he had.
General Jackson waited at White Oak Swamp during the battle of Frayser's Farm because he was directed to stay on this road until further orders. As a soldier he could do nothing else. He gave the same unquestioned obedience to the officer above him, that he demanded of those under his control. Moreover the stream was impassible for infantry under fire, and impassible for artillery without a bridge. Jackson and his staff, with Colonel Munford's cavalry, tested it, riding across through quagmires that took us up to the girths of our horses; but by a fierce artillery attack he kept Frank- lin's and part of Sumner's corps from joining with McCall to resist the attack at Frayser's Farm. This attack General Jackson began with twenty-eight pieces of artillery at twelve o'clock that day. The battle at Frayser's Farm began at five o'clock the same afternoon. White Oak Swamp road is but five miles distant. If General Lee had wanted Jackson he could have sent for him, but General Lee did not want him. He expected to defeat McCall, and isolate Franklin and Sumner, and then capture them with Jackson's co-operation, from the position he knew he occupied.
Cedar Run battle has been criticised as a barren victory, but while it did not accomplish all that Jackson intended, it was far from barren in its results. Pope, who had more than double the force of Jack- son, was preparing to attack us at Gordonsville and destroy the railroad. We remained two weeks at Gordonsville, waiting for Pope to make a false move, when, finding that Pope's divisions were widely separated the left wing being at Fredericksburg, and the right under Siegel, at Sperryville, fifty miles from the left wing; the main army on the Rappahannock with Banks thrown out to Cul- peper Courthouse, Jackson determined to strike them in detail.
I know this was his purpose and his after report proves it. He intended first to attack his old antagonist, Banks, at Culpeper, and then to descend like a thunderbolt on McDowell at Fredericksburg. On our route we lost an entire day because one of the division com- manders marched two miles instead of twenty-five. This gave Pope time to concentrate his forces. That night, as we pursued the beaten army of General Banks, we captured some of McDowell's men, prov- ing that the Federals had had time to concentrate, and this prevented him from carrying out his original plan of striking in detail. As it was, Banks' army was so crippled as to be "of little use," as Gen-