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Southern Historical Society Papers.

he feared he could not bring artillery to bear on the hill; that his troops were jaded by twelve hours' marching and righting, and he was told that Johnson's division, the only one of his corps not engaged, was close to the town, that he proposed with Johnson to take possession of a wooded hill, which could command Cemetery Heights, but before that was effected night had come on. The official reports of the brigade commanders of the second corps show that several of the brigades, notably Hays' and Ramseur's, were almost intact, and equal to any further calls which might be made on them.

General Early seems to have had a better perception of the situation, and after the first halt, was inclined to attack, but hesitated, he says, to procure co-operation, that he rode to find Ewell or Rodes or Hill for the purpose of urging an immediate attack, but before he could find either of these officers he was influenced by a report, which he did not believe, that the enemy was appearing on his left, and his resolution seems to have given way under the influence of the rumor. General Hill rested, he says, because being under the impression the enemy was entirely routed, and his two divisions exhausted by six hours' hard fighting, prudence led him to be content with what had been gained. No one can read these subsequent reports without a painful consciousness that there was a lamentable want of vigor on all sides, and an utter failure to apprehend the situation.

When Perrin cleared Seminary Ridge, and as he says "made it easy to drive the enemy down the opposing slope and across the open field west of Gettysburg," another approach to Cemetery Heights was open besides that from the town, which seems to have been overlooked.

Looking from Seminary Hill at that time across to Cemetery Heights, the confusion from the town was seen to extend to the Heights, and batteries could plainly be seen limbering up and apparently making for the rear. There is no reason why the Seminary Ridge should not then have been occupied with Confederate artillery to play upon the opposing heights. Had this been done, and the demoralized troops on Cemetery Heights been subjected to an artillery fire, it is certain the effect must have been disastrous, and might have led to an abandonment of