that at 7 A. M. the 6th Corps, and one-third of the 3d, and one-third of the 5th Corps were absent; at 9 A. M. the rest of the 3rd Corps arrived; at 12 M. the rest of the 5th Corps; at 10:30 A. M. the artillery reserves under Hunt came up; not until between 4 and 6 P. M. did the 6th Corps come up, after a continuous march of 34 miles. He also says that Buford's Cavalry had been ordered to Westminster, and thus the left of the line was left uncovered. Longstreet's attack was not made until 4 P. M., although his troops began to move about 2 o'clock. Thus his attack was delayed until the whole Federal army had arrived upon the ground and the golden opportunity of winning a great victory was lost.
There is, however, one feature of the drama on that fateful morning of July 2d which baffles all attempts at explanation. General Lee knew, through prisoners (Hist. Papers, 1877, Vol. IV, p. 268), that only a portion of the Federal army occupied the opposite ridge. "It is clear," says Henderson, "that an opportunity presented itself of dealing with the enemy in detail; and the meanest capacity must have grasped the advantage of storming the strong position south of Gettysburg before it should be occupied in overwhelming strength."
Yet he allowed Longstreet to argue against the assault, instead of making an immediate attack. That officer says "he went to Lee at daybreak and renewed his views against making the attack. He seemed resolved however."
But the thing that baffles us is this: Why did not Lee give Longstreet then absolute orders to advance to the attack? Hood and McLaws, with their splendid divisions, were in position at sunrise. Why did not Gen. Lee, knowing that every hour of delay was lessening the hope of success, launch those troops to the assault at once, in spite of Longstreet's objection?
It would seem that the mind of the great commander wavered, for he mounted his horse and rode over to confer with Ewell, on the left, to see if a successful attack could be made from that side, "not wishing," says Gen. Fitz. Lee, "to drive his right corps commander into battle when he did not want to go." (p. 278).
What a moment of fate it was! Gen. McLaws, sitting on his horse, could see the enemy coming, hour after hour, on to
