REVOCATION OF CONDITIONAL PARDON.
Upon satisfactory evidence that Richard D. Arthur, conditionally pardoned by my predecessor, had grossly violated the letter of at least one of the conditions of his pardon, and was constantly violating the spirit of all of them, I, upon the twenty-sixth day of March last, in accordance with the stipulations of the conditional pardon, revoked the same, and directed the sheriff of Winneshiek county, where Arthur was then to be found, forthwith to arrest him and take him to the penitentiary, which was accordingly done. I did not take this step without consideration and an inquiry into the practice in this state. I could find only one instance where violation of the conditions of a pardon had been established. In that case, Gov. Merrill revoked the pardon and ordered the prisoner to the penitentiary. A writ of habeas corpus was sued out, and the cause argued with the effect to remand the prisoner. (I have since learned this case was elaborately argued, and the whole question of the governor’s authority examined, before the conclusion I have mentioned was arrived at.) Soon after Arthur reached the penitentiary, he was brought before the judge of the first judicial district on a writ of habeas corpus; and after argument was released. Believing this was an erroneous determination, I requested the attorney-general, whose views coincided with my own, to take an appeal to the supreme court. This was accordingly done, and the case submitted at the December term. If the decision of the court below should be sustained, conditions attached to pardons will be practically worthless, unless additional legislation be had to provide for enforcing them. My observation satisfies me that in many cases where pardon is urged, the reasons assigned are of such a character that a pardon upon conditions that will test the thoroughness of the reformation a prisoner has undergone is the most desirable thing to be done, both for the prisoner and for society.
