Before passing from the Constitutional objections to this law, I would call the attention of your Honor to the partiality of the law, which is so at variance with the designs of the Fathers in organizing this Government. No man can read the Constitution—in which the word slave cannot be found; from which the idea that a man could be reduced to a thing, and held as property, was carefully excluded—no man, I say, can read that Constitution, and come to the conclusion that slavery was to be fostered, guaranteed and protected far beyond every thing else in the country. Admit that Jim Gray was Phillips's property, how comes it that that particular property is more sacred than any other property? Phillips's horse escapes from him, and is found in a distant State; but the President of the United States, and every department of Government, are not put on the track to find the horse, and return him to Phillips's stable, and then pay the whole bill from the National Treasury. No, Sir. But his slave escapes—he runs away, and, for some reason, his property in man is so much more holy and sacred, that the whole Government is bound to take the track and hunt the poor panting fugitive down, and carry him back to his chains and bondage at the Government's expense
Sir, under a Constitution unstained by the word slave, we have a law magnifying slave property above all other property in the nation—a law giving it guarantees that no other property could possibly obtain. Sir, the partiality of this law is so great, that it stands opposed to a Constitution that guarantees equal justice and protection to all.
John G. Fee is driven out of his Kentucky home, and robbed of the fruits of his life-long toil. There is no power to secure him his home, or protect him in his rights of property or opinion. But had John G. Fee only owned a slave, and his slave escaped, the Government, under this law, would have followed his slave to the utmost limit of the United States, and returned his slave to him at its own expense. Your Honor will pardon me, (if I need pardon,) but I cannot, for the life of me, see what there is in robbing a man of his inalienable rights and enslaving him for life, that should entitle it to the special and peculiar protection of national law.
I am aware, Sir, that I shall be reminded that judges,
