detail, division after division; it is defeated before having lost a man. This is plain.
Keep in mind that the South thinks of going to war for the benefit and protection of slavery. But slavery is not merely an abstract principle; slavery consists materially in the individual slaves—in so-and-so many millions of human chattels scattered over so-and-so many thousands of square miles. In order to protect slavery, it is essential that the individual slaveholders be protected in the possession of their individual slaves.
I say, therefore, that slavery cannot be protected in general without being protected in detail. But how can you protect it in detail? By guarding fifteen hundred miles of Northern frontier and two thousand miles of seacoast against an enemy who is perfectly free in his movements, and, aided by an extensive railroad system, always able to concentrate his forces wherever he pleases? It is impossible; the dullest understanding sees it. It may be said that it will not be necessary; indeed, for the free States it would not; they may, in order to concentrate their forces, expose their territory, for the damage done by an invasion is easily repaired. The retreating invader cannot carry the liberties of the invaded country away with him. Not so with slavery. A Northern anti-slavery army or even a small flying corps invading a slaveholding State would, perhaps not at once systematically liberate the slaves, but at all events it would not squander much time and health in catching the runaways. The probability, therefore, is that wherever a Northern army appears, the slaves will disappear, and so much of slavery with them—at least for the time being. Invade a free State, and the restoration of liberty, after the attack is repulsed, requires only the presence of freemen. But the restoration of slavery will require capital; that capital consisted principally in the slaves;
