alone. Every day that passes without decisive results consolidates secession in itself. We must make up our minds to conquer the South as we would conquer a foreign country;—a thing so much more difficult as this is not a war of armies but of the people, where the advantages are all on the side of the defensive. The idea of starving them out is utterly absurd. Their resources are inferior but better used; besides, standing on the defensive, they have them near at hand. To annihilate their armies and to beat the rebellious spirit thoroughly out of them will, it seems to me, in the ordinary way of warfare, require more time than our own resources will permit us to spend upon it,—and perhaps also more military strength than we possess. Thus the war bids fair to assume the character of the Carlist war in Spain; that is to say, thoroughly exhaust and demoralize the country and finally leave the advantage with the defensive,—unless we avail ourselves of the only thing which is sure to settle the business quickly and definitely. We must proclaim the emancipation of the slaves. You know well that my opinions in relation to slavery are sufficiently decided. And yet, in point of principle, I would not be anxious to see the emancipation measure adopted so suddenly, for I think slavery will perish at all events in consequence of this struggle. But if we want to save the Union it seems to me utterly indispensable to avail ourselves of this most powerful weapon without delay.
What I hear from the United States leads me to believe that the Administration is strongly opposed to this policy. I have some reason to suspect that some of its members still hope for a change of public opinion, a spontaneous reaction in the South. If the war is to be conducted upon such ideas, I fear thousands of lives and hundreds of millions will be spent in vain. Our victories, if indeed we should be lucky enough to achieve any, will be useless
