unable, after having conquered a great rebellion, to provide for the future security of the Republic by imposing conditions upon the defeated enemy. They are profound Constitutional lawyers, I presume, and I wish them joy.
In the meantime, I trust no honest and patriotic man will find it difficult to understand this aspect of the question. In the course of the war the Government wanted money, and called upon the people for loans under the distinct and solemn promise that the lender should have his interest and principal as provided by law. This constituted our obligation to the National creditor. The Government wanted aid and coöperation inside of the rebellious States, and called upon the Union men of the South to come forward, under the distinct understanding that they should not be abandoned to the tender mercies of the rebels. This constituted our National obligations to the Union men of the South. The Government wanted to weaken the enemy and increase its forces in the field, and it called upon the negro to take part in the conflict, under the distinct and solemn promise that his race should be forever and truly free. This constituted our National obligation to the negro.
Great as is my respect for our fundamental law, I do not hesitate to affirm that these obligations, as to their binding force, stand upon a level with the Constitution itself. If there were nothing in the Constitution of the United States providing means, or expressly indicating a mode in which those obligations shall be fulfilled, would it not still be the great duty of the Republic to fulfil them? If it was Constitutional to make those promises, must it not be equally Constitutional to clear away all obstacles which might prevent us from keeping them? If it is our duty to pay the National debt and to secure their rights to the loyalists and freedmen of the South, is it not also our duty, not only to do all that is necessary to that end,
