grocery in one of the lower wards, who exercises political influence, and, in order to propitiate that man of power, the “claims” of the old apple-woman had to be recognized by putting her name on the pay-rolls of the customhouse.
You notice officers there called inspectors; officers whose duties are of the very highest consequence. They, in fact, to a very great extent, hold the revenue of the customhouse in their hands; for they have to watch the unloading of ships and see to it that no goods are smuggled into the city from the vessels arriving in that port. What class of people are those inspectors taken from? We heard it said the other day by the Senator from New Hampshire that they, as they themselves confess, are in the habit of accepting bribes of fifteen to fifty dollars for each vessel that is unloaded under their supervision; that they accept those bribes as a rule, not as an exception. And those officers are selected from that class of people of whom the Senator from New York told us, that, yielding to the frailties of human nature, they would naturally drift into the habit of taking presents or bribes, and you would not expect anything else. If you cannot expect anything else, what becomes of the revenue? But, I will admit, under the present system of distributing offices, you have, indeed, no right to expect anything better.
I will not go into any further particulars. You may think that in New York things were in a bad condition, but that at other places they would present themselves differently. Go across the continent to San Francisco, and you will find exactly the same system working there, leading to similar results. You will be told there that under the prevailing system five collectors went out of office as defaulters to the Government. You will be told that, under the law, officers are to be examined before they are appointed, and yet the very heads of those establishments will, at the same time, inform you that
