duty, they are regarded as conquests, the conquest of a party; as “berths” into which men are put, not to use the best of their energies, not to look with anxiety after the interests of the Government, but to make it comfortable for themselves and to serve their friends. And you have learned more: how current these words “spoils” and “plunder” have become in the mouths of the people, so that we have lost almost all sense of their fearful meaning.
I repeat, sir, there is nothing astonishing in all these abuses, if you consider the natural effect of such a system upon the frailties of human nature, which we have heard discussed so feelingly in the course of this debate.
Sir, when a man receives an office as a reward for political services rendered, or as an incentive for further political work; when he feels himself sustained, less by his own energy and efficiency than by political influence, is he not naturally led to rely upon that political influence instead of his own fidelity and efficiency to sustain him in office? Is it not a matter of experience, that even well-intentioned men, who go into office honest and industrious, frequently become dishonest and lazy there, feeling that political influence is more potent than the appreciation of dutiful conduct?
Let us look further. Is not the short and uncertain tenure of office a very severe temptation to a man burdened with the ordinary frailties of human nature to make the most of short opportunities, or at least to have the greatest possible benefit from the least possible work? Hence the formation of “rings” in the public service, of which I will give you an instance in my own experience. I was informed by a very reliable and honorable gentleman, a clerk in one of our Departments here, that immediately after his appointment he endeavored to fulfil his duty to the very best of his ability, doing as much work as he
