do not. These others speculate upon the frailties of human nature among their constituents. Observe one of the latter; how he attempts to build up the machinery of his influence at home; and for this the patronage offers him the ready means. He makes promises of office for the purpose of obtaining support, sometimes promiscuously, recklessly, in duplicate and in triplicate—promises impossible to be kept. Look at the situation of such a man. He is covered all over with fraudulent mortgages, and he stands before himself as a dishonorable deceiver before he is elected. By his promises he may have endeavored to buy others; he has certainly succeeded in demoralizing himself.
But now he is elected, and he commences to distribute offices. The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Morton], whom I am sorry not to see in his seat, says that the system by which a Congressman is to distribute local offices is a guaranty for conscientious recommendations, for a Congressman would make himself unpopular by recommending unworthy men to public places. In some cases that may be so; but is it not frequently otherwise? Does not a Congressman frequently make recommendations for office merely for the purpose of paying old debts, discharging political obligations, or preparing for a new campaign with a view to his own reëlection?
But, sir, when he commences to distribute the offices, those duplicate and triplicate promises come down upon him; and what then? Then you will find those cases which are referred to in the essay of ex-Secretary Cox where he describes honorable Senators and members of the House of Representatives standing before a member of the Cabinet with recommendations in their hands and with the candidates for office on their arms, abounding in expressions of good will and friendship for their protégés, presenting them as the worthiest of mortals, whose
