were at peace. Is not that so? Is not this order in itself, standing alone, unsupported by anything else, an act of war as far as the Executive department can commit an act of war?
Mr. Howe rose.
Mr. Schurz. I would ask the Senator from Wisconsin to be patient a moment; I have to add something. The President does not himself in his own person load and fire the gun; he can only order the gun to be loaded and fired; and he did so order. It is true the President made the actual use of arms, that is to say, the flagrant, bloody act of war, dependent upon a certain contingency. But, I ask the Senator from Wisconsin, has the President the power under the Constitution at his own arbitrary pleasure and discretion to define a contingency in which the arms of the United States shall be used against a nation with whom the United States are at peace? Has he the unlimited discretion to order the use of arms in a contingency so defined by himself? Let us consider. If he has that discretionary power to define a contingency in which the arms of the United States shall be used in the actual commission of a belligerent act, then he has power to use the arms of the United States to commit acts of war in contingencies of his own choosing; that is to say, whenever he pleases. And what becomes of that provision of the Constitution lodging the war-making power in Congress? It signifies nothing at all; it is written in water. Sir, that simple provision of the Constitution that Congress shall have power to declare war cannot by any rule of construction be interpreted to mean anything else but that Congress, and not the President alone, shall define the contingencies in which the belligerent power of the United States is to be used. I therefore affirm that the President in ordering the naval commanders of the United States to capture and destroy by force of arms the vessels
