Now, sir, having read these dispatches, these orders, these proclamations, these messages issued by John Tyler and other members of the Executive department, and compared them with the order issued by the Secretary of the Navy, I should like to ask, is not in this point the difference between the two cases as clear as sunlight? There, an instruction to observe events, and before committing any belligerent act to wait for further orders; here, the order to commit the belligerent act distinctly and emphatically given, with the imperative addition, “there must be no failure in this matter”; and this not only before the treaty of annexation is ratified; nay, sir, these orders even continued in force long after the treaty of annexation had been formally rejected by the Senate and wiped out of existence. If Tyler did indeed entertain any such intention as the Senator from Indiana ascribes to him, he was very successful in concealing it; at any rate, he was very careful not to give effect to it. There were the naval and military forces in his case, quietly and patiently lying on the lookout; but here we see a rear-admiral of the United States, with a heavy armament, steaming into the port of a Power with which the United States are at peace, and saying to them, with his hand at their throats, “If you attempt to do a thing”—which, the Senator may say what he pleases, was still within the province of their independent sovereignty to do——
Mr. Morton. Will the Senator allow me to make a statement?
Mr. Schurz. I should be glad to be permitted to finish my sentence.
The Vice-President. Does the Senator yield?
Mr. Schurz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morton. The Senator reads certain instructions given to the commander of the naval forces, and a dispatch to Mr. Murphy from Mr. Nelson. Now, if he intends to
