the disaster might easily have been prevented, had not our friends, probably you and I among the rest, considered the nomination of Mr. Adams certain until the last ballot was taken. And when Greeley had a majority of the votes, a not inconsiderable number of the supporters of Adams changed to his side, many left the hall before the result of the ballot was announced and a demonstration on the spot had become impossible. In fact, the consternation was so great that scarcely anybody seemed to have a definite idea of what should or could be done. I did not find three of our friends together in spite of diligent search after the event.
Moreover, I had a reason for not putting myself too prominently forward in making a nomination, which perhaps few others will appreciate. I am foreign born, a circumstance which is thrown into my face but too frequently. I should not play the role of a President-maker, and it would not have been desirable for any candidate in this case to appear as my nominee. I had encountered so much of this kind of prejudice already, that I did not consider it wise to provoke it. Just in that sort of business I must appear as a follower. This feeling had much to do with determining my conduct at Cincinnati and afterwards. Still, I will not say now that it would not have been better to disregard such considerations in that emergency, if anything could have been effected. But we are all so much wiser after the event than before.
At the New York conference I came to the conclusion that it was too late for anything but a mere demonstration, and that there was no man upon whom measurably to unite the elements of the opposition, except Greeley. A third nomination then would probably have induced the Baltimore Convention to nominate a straight-out Democrat, which would have materially impeded the
