not impair, but, looking at it without prejudice, you will find that it virtually protects the rights of the States.
I have now endeavored to show, in a way at least satisfactory to myself, if to nobody else, that the power to act as the judge of the election of its members means the same thing for both houses of Congress; secondly, that it covers for both houses of Congress alike the power to vacate a seat filled by an election carried by fraud or bribery; third, that by the exercise of that power by the Senate, no Constitutional rights of the States are impaired.
But, sir, we are reminded that the resolution now before us for our action has no precedent in the history of the Senate. I admit that; but Senators will be obliged to admit also that the disclosures here made have no precedent in the history of this body; and for the honor of the American people I will suppose that were there a precedent for the one, there would be precedent for the other; that if such a case had ever been disclosed to the American Senate, then the American Senate would have found a remedy and would not have hesitated to apply it.
But if there is no precedent in our past history, is it not time to make one? All precedents are once made for the first time, and I hope, if such a duty devolves upon us, we shall not shrink from it.
It is said, also, that the acceptance of the doctrine upon which this resolution is based would arm a bare majority with dangerous powers. Sir, there is certainly the possibility of an abuse of the power. I feel it keenly. There is no power on earth ever so carefully guarded but is liable to abuse. It is the nature of power. But I invite Senators to consider whether the danger on the other side is not more to be dreaded than the danger on this. What will be the consequence if, under circumstances such as are now surrounding us, we do reject
