tingency into consideration. He has to run what I have already called the gambling risk. Now, suppose the Senator from Indiana had $100,000 to lend out. If he were asked to lend it out, say on three months, he would have to consider whether at the time when the loan will be returned to him his $100,000 will be worth as much as it was when he lent it out. The currency being inflated and depreciation being the consequence, he will ask himself whether the paper dollar, which is, say, at 10 per cent. discount to-day, will not be at 16 per cent. discount when he gets his money back. Under ordinary circumstances, with a currency of stable value, he may be willing to lend out money say at 6 per cent. a year; but when he is exposed to the chance of losing in three months 6 per cent., or in one month 2 per cent. in the value of the money invested in the loan, then he will certainly not be willing to lend out that money at one-half of 1 per cent. a month, for the simple reason that it would be a losing business to the amount of 1½ per cent. a month. What will he do, therefore? He will in all probability not be disposed to lend out his $100,000 on three months time at all. He will prefer to lend it out on call, in the first place, so as to be able to put his hand upon it as soon as the chances so turn that he may lose by leaving it out longer where he has put it; but even then he will want to cover his risk, and he will do that by demanding a higher rate of interest, sufficient to cover that risk. Hence it is that loans on call are preferred, and a higher rate of interest is demanded by lenders to cover the gambling risk, under the influence exercised by an irredeemable currency, which, by its fluctuations, renders the value of the money invested in a loan insecure.
Gentlemen complain that money cannot be had except on call. There is nothing surprising in this. There are, under such circumstances, two good reasons for the un-
