referred to the legislature, which, in 1871, would have had power to abolish disfranchisement. But how refer it? Was not the constitutional amendment before the people demanding an answer, “ay” or “no,” and should we say “no,” and first defeat the constitutional amendment in order to refer the matter from the people to the pleasure of a majority in the legislature? Would not that have been absurd? But my colleague himself in his speeches avowed the reason why he desired that reference to the legislature. It was that he wanted to preserve at least part of the system which our consciences condemned, and we were not foolish enough to fall into his trap. And, besides, would that have preserved the unity of the party? It would simply have transferred the struggle to the legislative districts, ranging the Republicans for disfranchisement on one side and the Republicans hostile to disfranchisement on the other.
But might we not have submitted to the action of the convention and fought for enfranchisement just as well? Had we done that, what then? We might indeed have been at liberty to pronounce individually against disfranchisement. But their victory in the convention would have inspired the friends of the obnoxious system with new courage and determination. Every nook and corner of the State would have rung with a bitter fight against the constitutional amendment; its enemies would have strained every nerve and organized a registration more arbitrary than ever to defeat it; all the scandals of former elections would have repeated themselves. But, as it was, the mere act of our leaving the convention, showing our determined earnestness, already decided the contest. A popular uprising took place, before which even the bitterest enemies of enfranchisement finally yielded their opposition. When the matter was already virtually decided, then one by one they dropped; and at
