deemable Government paper currency? A new element of fluctuation and uncertainty would have been thrown into the general confusion; the stock gamblers and speculators might perhaps have succeeded in loading their rotten ventures upon the shoulders of new victims; but the stagnation of legitimate business would unquestionably have continued, capital would surely not have ventured out, confidence would not have returned, the general distress would certainly have lingered on, until at last that element of unsafety and deception—an irredeemable and fluctuating currency—had been wiped out, and the business of the country had been placed again on the sound basis of the stability of current values.
Can we fail to understand that lesson? Examine the crisis which broke out two years ago, in September, 1873. That crash did not contract our currency; on the contrary, what there was remained, and shortly after the volume of greenbacks was increased twenty-five millions by successive issues from the so-called reserve. Money did not disappear, as it did in 1837 and 1857. There was more of it than before, and yet the general stagnation and suffering continue, and the future appears to us dark and gloomy, without any sign of improvement. Yes, we have more money than before; but who of you can tell me what that money will be worth twenty days after the opening of the next session of Congress? Who of you can tell me what wild antics that money may play with the fortunes of all of us, if those who clamor for inflation now should obtain control of the National Government a year hence? And now, feeling as we do with every step, instead of firm ground, a treacherous quicksand under our feet, is there still anybody who asks why confidence does not revive, why capital timidly shrinks back, why the mass of money idly accumulated in the banks does not trust itself into the hands of enterprise, why prosperity does not return,
