which will enable him to perform the duties of customhouse officer, or postmaster, or revenue collector satisfactorily; but you must not prefer a man irrespective of his character and business qualifications, on the ground that he has “claims” for party service rendered, or as a good political wirepuller who knows how to pack primaries.
Secondly, if you want your postmaster, or customhouse officer, or revenue collector to remain honest and to do his whole duty, you must make him understand that the performance of his official duties is the only thing he is paid for; that he is the servant of the Government and the people, and not the agent of a political party; that he is required to stick to his official business, and will be liable to removal if he uses his official power or influence for partisan purposes; that as long as he performs his official duties honestly and efficiently he will stay in his place and no longer; that continued good service or extraordinary efficiency will entitle him to promotion; but that if he indulges in dishonest practices he will be severely held to account, and that no consideration of party service rendered, or to be rendered, and no party influence can save him. This is the way to keep men in office efficient and honest.
Now, how are you to insure the selection of fit persons for office? Let me tell you first how you will not insure the selection of fit men. You will not do it by turning out all, or nearly all, the officers, good as well as bad, at the incoming of a new Administration, in the way of a “new deal,” rendering necessary some 60,000 or 70,000 new appointments in a hurly-burly, when the President and heads of Departments have just dropped into their places, and are still bewildered by the variety and complication of new duties suddenly overwhelming them; it is simply impossible to use the necessary care under such circumstances. You will not insure the selection of fit men if
