command universal confidence in times of excited party feeling the tribunal should be as far as possible removed from party strife, party interest and party ambition. Only then will the impartiality of its judgment be generally and unreservedly believed in. Unquestionably Congress is not such a tribunal. There are, no doubt, men in the Senate and in the House of Representatives who in the discharge of important duties endeavor to divest their minds of all party bias. But on the whole inasmuch as the members of the National Legislature owe their places to the instrumentality of party organization, it is not unnatural that in many respects party interest and spirit should have a strong influence in shaping their opinions as well as their actions. It can scarcely be otherwise; and even supposing members to act upon motives ever so conscientious, their impartiality will not have general credit when in a matter involving party interests of such magnitude as the result of a Presidential election their judgment favors the candidate of their organization. But in a crisis like this the final verdict should not only be impartial; it should also appear so.
When looking for a tribunal fitted by its character and recognized authority to act as the great umpire of political parties in determining the result of a disputed Presidential election we find only one—it is the Supreme Court of the United States. In the debates which some time ago occurred in the Senate on a bill to regulate the counting of the electoral vote the idea was frequently put forth that, when the two houses disagreed on the reception of the electoral vote of a State or in case of the presentation of two sets of certificates from one State, on the question which of the two should be received, that question should be referred for decision to the Supreme Court or to one or more members of it. The only strong argument urged against this proposition was that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
