the service, and also the true nature of the difficulties standing in the way of a full development of that system.
Now, when in discussing this matter anybody indulges in solemn hints about mysterious things which the official mind has to deal with, but which the unofficial mind cannot understand, he cannot make any impression upon me. I am familiar with the augur's wink and with the smiles that follow it. It is equally useless to talk to me about fiduciary or confidential positions which should be filled only at the free discretion of the appointing officer; for I know from abundant experience that in an overwhelming majority of cases that free discretion is a myth and that the fiduciary appointments are dictated by political influence; and I know also that in a well-regulated civil service with merit appointment, merit promotion and merit tenure all those so-called extraordinary qualifications for certain positions can easily be secured without exposing any of the places to the chance of becoming the prey of spoils politics.
In fact, after four years of service, I left the Interior Department with the firm conviction that the positions in it, and no doubt in all the other Departments, would, taking the general average, be vastly better filled and that the work would be much more efficiently and economically done—in one word, that the public interest would be much better served, if the whole force in and under those Departments, without any exception worth mentioning, were subjected to the civil service rules, including even, if that were possible, the commissioners and assistant commissioners of the different bureaus, and in each Department at least one permanent under secretary. And the same four years of official experience convinced me that there is only one real difficulty obstructing the full development of the merit system in our public service—and that is the pressure of political in-
