to the Senate the discussion of the subject in the press was started, the scheme found so little favor that the prospect of obtaining for it a two-thirds vote in the Senate seemed to grow darker and darker. It is not too much to say that its failure in Congress would have been well-nigh certain, had not the unreasoning excitement caused by the Spanish war helped it through. Mr. McKinley's sudden change of attitude can, therefore, not be explained upon the theory of popular pressure. How, then, could it be explained? About the time of Mr. McKinley's second nomination for the Presidency I mentioned the occurrences here related in conversation with a friend of mine, a gentleman of high character and social position, who from time to time had business with the Government in Washington and a large acquaintance there. He told me that he could solve the enigma. “I had no idea,” he observed, “what kind of people could exercise an influence with Mr. McKinley; the conversion of the President in favor of the annexation of Hawaii had been brought about by a gang of sugar speculators in pursuit of profit. The President had, of course, no pecuniary interest in the scheme; he probably had no idea of what those persons were after, but they had made him believe that the annexation was a good thing for his party and his Administration.” Whether my friend was right or not, I do not know. He may have been mistaken. But he evidently believed what he said.
However this may have been, it will not be found unnatural after all this that I should not attach to Mr. McKinley's official or unofficial utterances so much credence as many others do. When in the course of events he solemnly declared that “annexation by force could not be thought of because according to the American code of morals, it would be criminal aggression,” and then inaugurated a barefaced war of conquest; when he
