lying our system of government are very different from those of the kingdom of Naples, and that the means of protection I spoke of run contrary to the spirit of our institutions. Indeed, so it seems to be. What does that prove? Simply this: that a social institution which is in antagonism with the principles of democratic government cannot be maintained and protected by means which are in accordance with those principles; and, on the other hand, that a social institution that cannot be protected by means that are in accordance with the democratic principles of our government, must essentially be in antagonism to those principles. It proves that the people in the slaveholding States, although pretending to be freemen, are, by the necessities arising from their condition, the slaves of slavery. That is all.
But I am told that the Slave States are sovereign as to their domestic institutions, and may shape and govern their home concerns according to their own notions, subject only to the Constitution of the United States. Granted. But the necessities of slavery do not stop there. The Slave States are members of a Federal family, and as the King of Naples in his foreign policy is governed by his peculiar interests, so is the policy of the Slave States in our Federal affairs governed by their peculiar necessities.
I hear much said of the aggressive spirit of the slave power, but I am almost inclined to acquit it of that charge, for all its apparently aggressive attempts are no less dictated by instinct of self-preservation, than the most striking features of its home policy.
Let us listen to the slaveholder again. He says: “What will become of the security of our slave property, if, inside of this Union, a slave may finally escape from the hands of his master, by simply crossing the line of his State? But the fanatical anti-slavery spirit prevailing in
