it is to know the truth concerning facts fraudulently represented, cannot complain if he acted upon the false representations. He was not deceived, or, at least, would not have been, had he done that which the law required him to do—that is, made due inquiry on the subject. Bigelow on Fraud, 336. Where the means of information are at hand, and equally open to both parties, and no concealment made or attempted, the language of the cases is: That misrepresentation furnished no ground for a court of equity to refuse to enforce the contract of the parties. Slaughter's administrator v. Gerson, 13 Wal. 385.
This rule applies to verbal contracts. If a contract is reduced to writing, the only evidence of the understanding and consent of parties to the terms expressed, is the written contract itself. The object of the Statute of Frauds was to prevent such proof by parol. To allow the party to prove by parol that he did not consent to the terms of a written contract signed by him, would defeat the very object of the statute.
SMITH, J. The Railway Company sued Beidler in ejectment for eighty acres of land. He claimed to have bought of the Company fifty-three 75-100 acres, parcel of the tract described in the complaint, paying one-fourth in cash and giving his notes for the deferred payments. He made his answer a cross-bill, tendered the residue of the purchase money and demanded a specific performance of the agreement. The cause was transferred to equity and for defenses the Company set up the Statute of Frauds and insisted that the contract upon which Beidler relied was obtained by means of false and fraudulent representations, and that as soon as the deception which had been practiced was discovered, it had offered to refund Beidler's money and had destroyed his notes. The decree was that the Company should execute to Beidler a good and sufficient deed with covenants of warranty, for the premises mentioned in the cross-bill, upon the completion of his payments.
