as indissolubly connected together, and that their mutual powers and authority acted in perfect harmony and in support of each other, like the great principles incorporated by their enactments. According to the construction I design to give, there can be no conflict between these jurisdictions, nor any discrepancy arising from their action. I hold the doctrine that the Constitution of the United States, and the laws passed in pursuance of its authority, are supreme; and that all State constitutions and laws repugnant to them, are utterly null and void; and that the Constitution and laws of the Federal Government operate directly upon the people and the States, and all are bound to respect and obey them. Again; who compose the militia? Has not the State a right to designate what part or portion of her citizens shall constitute this military corps? Then she can, by indirection, arm only those who are in her interest, or who are swayed by her ambition; and, by denying arms to every other class of her citizens, may she not subjugate the liberties of all, by the very means the Constitution gives for their protection and defence?
By way of testing this principle, suppose the Legislature pass an act, that a man should not keep private arms in his own house secretly, or about his person concealed, although they should be every way necessary, in defence of his life, liberty, or property. Can it be doubted that such an act would be a palpable infraction of the Constitution, as well as an invasion of the natural rights of society? Has not every man a natural and an unalienable right to defend his life, liberty, or property, when a known felony is attempted to be committed upon either by violence or surprise? Can any laws deprive him of this right? Upon what principle has he a right to use force to repel force, and even to slay the aggressor, if he cannot make a successful repulsion otherwise? The laws of the land being unable to protect him, the laws of nature step in, and authorize him to defend himself. Now, it has been often ruled, by the Courts of England, that an act clearly against the laws of natural justice and equity, is not binding; and that if Parliament, which is omnipotent in every thing, pass such acts, they are presumed to have intended no such outrage or wrong. To put this case in its true light—suppose a citizen of the State were indicted upon a charge of murder, and he could
