Palestine]
anything else the condition of Ottoman government in Syria a hundred years ago.
Imperfect Imperial Control.—Over even its imperial officers the Porte exercised very imperfect control, excepting over the weakest, the Pasha of Aleppo. One not infrequently made war on another. In 1803 the Pasha of Damascus marched on the Pasha of Baghdad, and in the following year was himself attacked by the Kiaya of the Pasha of Acre. The last-named pashalik had become almost private property. Ahmed Jezzar, who had foiled Napoleon, lived on to 1804; and, dying, bequeathed south Syria to one of his Mamelukes. The Porte could do no more than "confirm" the nominee of Jezzar. Actually, in 1810, Suleiman Pasha of Acre was holding not only Gaza, but also Damascus. and Tripoli; that is to say, so far as the bulk of Syria was under any one rule, it was under a Prince of Acre. And so it was to remain for twenty years more. To avoid infringing this imperium in imperio, and revealing the unreality of Osmanli control, the Caliph's Grand Vizier, who was commissioned in 1807 to turn the British out of Egypt, had to lead his army down the uncomfortable roads east of the Jordan; and it is not surprising that, three years later, no political effect of this manifestation of imperial power was visible in Syria.
Suzerainty of Caliph.—Nevertheless, if there was little substance of Ottoman Empire in Syria, there was everywhere something more than its shadow. Burckhardt somewhat minimises it. The pashas and almost all local princelings, Emirs, and Beys not only acknowledged the suzerainty of the Caliph by seeking (sometimes ex post facto) his approval of their successions or usurpations and paying a quit-rent for them, but also had a precarious and usually brief tenure, if disowned by the suzerain. Burckhardt does, in fact, admit that not to show marks of fealty was ill-esteemed by the Syrian population of whatever race and creed; and anyone who withheld them was, regarded as illegitimate or a rebel. Ahmed Jezzar had an Ottoman
