middle and south Syria than French interest had done before it; but the fact that two European Powers, with growing and antagonistic interests in the Levant,[1] had gained a footing, where one alone used to be, foreshadowed danger.
The Egyptian Invasion.—This danger the Egyptian invasion and occupation of Syria was to bring to a head. Anxious to secure his Pashalik from sudden attack, to command a supply of ship timber, and to control the land to which 6,000 Sharkiyah fellahin had escaped from military service, Mehemet Ali had been giving a favourable éar for a while past to some (chiefly ex-officers of the Grand Army) who constantly reminded him of the example of Napoleon. He had tried, by cajolery and bribery, in 1822 and 1823, to persuade the youth and inexperience of Abdullah, the heir of Jezzar, to link his fate with Egypt's; and, failing, had asked the Porte outright for the Acre Pashalik no-less than thrice. Put off with Crete only, he resolved to take what would not be given. It was the hope of France that he might succeed. Predominant in his councils, she looked to be carried back into Syria by his arms; and subsequently the Porte on more than one occasion reproached the French Government with interested connivance in a rebellion which, alone among the five Great Powers, France refused eventually to extinguish. Great Britain remained indifferent, trusting to her hold on both Mehemet Ali and the Emir of the Lebanon, and unwilling to thwart the controller of the overland route to India. Both Powers, therefore, kept their fleets out of harm's way; and late in October 1831 Ibrahim Pasha crossed the desert to go a greater distance than either he or his father had planned or desired, and effect more than they would ever know. For it is this Egyptian occupation which closed in Syria the ancient order of decentralised autonomy, and introduced the modern order of centralised dependence, vexed and limited by the rival interests of foreign Powers.
- ↑ See especially Driault. Question d' Orient, Paris, 1917.
