in the shape of tactical scruples, whether the leader would be justified in leading his subordinates to certain death, whether it would not be his duty to preserve the force entrusted to him for more important duty in the service of the fatherland, instead of sacrificing it uselessly. If, in addition, an officer has been allowed, in time of peace, to criticise, from the start, an order of his superior with reference to its feasibility, it may easily happen in the stern reality of actual war that a subordinate leader, neither especially courageous nor ambitious, succumbs to the seductive whisperings of his senses on the approach of danger and sees in caution the better part of valor. It is always suspicious if troops have become accustomed to consider insignificant losses, common to colonial wars, accompanied by great physical exertions, as indications of good leadership.[1] Great victories are, as a rule, invariably accompanied by great losses.
- ↑ In this connection and in regard to the British losses in South Africa, see my lecture: Die Lehren des Burenkrieges (1904), p. 8, et seq. The behavior of Sir Redvers Buller at Colenso and Spionskop is interesting. See The Times History of the War in South Africa, III, pp. 234, 236, 297, 318.
