- nounced since the introduction of smokeless powder. "The
invisibility of the enemy directly affects the morale of the soldier, the sources of his energy and his courage. The soldier who cannot see his enemy, is inclined to see him everywhere. It is but a step from this impression to hesitancy and then to fear. The inertia of the troops for whole days at Magersfontain, Colenso, and Paardeberg, frequently more than 800 m. from the enemy, was not produced by their losses, but by the moral depression which is caused within the effective zone of rifle fire." (General Negrier.)[1]
The effect of danger on the battlefield is indicated by—
1. Derangement of tactical units;
2. The mixing of men of the different units during the action; and
3. The dissolution of units into disorderly masses.
According to the History of the Kaiser Franz Regiment (p. 113) immediately
after the battle of St. Privat, most of the companies numbered only
30 men, and the whole regiment only 340 men, although, allowing for losses,
there should have been 1922 men. The three companies of the 39th Füsilier
Regiment which had fought in the Stiring Wald at Spicheren, numbered
only 6 officers and 150 men at the close of the fight in the evening,[2] which
means that, allowing for losses, 350 men were missing. After the battle of
Colombey, when the Füsilier Battalion of the 55th Regiment was assembled,
three companies numbered only 120, 60 and 40 men, respectively.
This battalion had lost about 300 men.
The plan of the battle of Colombey given in the General Staff Account (Gt. St. W.) shows at 7 P. M. 17 companies belonging to 5 different infantry regiments, and to two different infantry brigades, occupying a front of 1200 paces, in the following order:
7. 1. 4. 8. 4. 6. 12. 7. 10. 11. 12. 1. 1.
, , , , , , , , , , ,
Jägers. 55. 15. 15. 53. 15. 15. 15. 13. 13. 73.
9. 10. 4. 3. Cos.
, ,
15. 73. Inf.
