VII. INFANTRY VERSUS CAVALRY.[1]
(Par. 451 German I. D. R.).
The individual infantryman whose rifle is loaded and who
knows how to use his bayonet is more than a match for the
individual mounted man even on open ground; and, if he remains
cool, retains his presence of mind, and uses his rifle
properly while keeping the opponent constantly in view, he is
even superior to several mounted men. Infantry which retains
its steadiness has nothing to fear even when outnumbered by
cavalry. Its main strength lies in steadily delivered fire, while
cavalry relies on the possibility of making an unexpected rapid
charge, on quickly covering great distances, and on the moral
effect which its irresistible onslaught undoubtedly produces
upon infantry. So long as there is a possibility of surprise and
misunderstanding, of infantry allowing itself to become discouraged,
and of the individual soldier being exposed to hunger
and hardships, so long will cavalry that is energetically led be
able to gain brilliant victories. Tactics would look differently
upon the possibility of making a mounted charge during a
battle if one or two German cavalry divisions had been on the
Japanese side during the pursuit after Mukden. "If we demand
of infantry that it close with the enemy after it has
suffered tremendous losses, why should we not demand the
same of cavalry whose mobility is disproportionately greater."
(Skobeleff's Order for the Day, June 15th, 1882). The less
the world believes in a victory of cavalry, the greater the certainty
of such success. The troops should be accustomed in
time of peace to the sight of charging cavalry. The recom-*
- ↑ Taktik, II, p. 137: Die Attacke der Kavallerie auf Infanterie. For examples from military history consult the splendid works of Major Kunz, especially Die deutsche Reiterei, and Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele, 5.
