minutes, and then advanced by rushes by companies (first the right, then the left companies of the battalions). During this advance the supports (2 battalions) were absorbed by the firing line. At the same time the brigade reserve approached closer to the firing line (the original distance between reserve and firing line, before the advance began, was 300 m.). The last halt for firing was made at 250 m., from the enemy's position, and the latter was then carried in one rush. The losses amounted only to 235 men.[1]
In the IInd and IVth Armies, who fought, as a rule, on terrain devoid of cover, a far more cautious method of attack was produced. The distinguishing features of this mode of attack were thin firing lines (skirmishers at intervals of 5-10 paces) increasing only very gradually in density, and great frontage (a company 250, a battalion 800, and a brigade 2000-3000 m.).[2] This caused the attack to falter in many instances as soon as it had come within 400 m. of the hostile position, whereupon nothing remained but for the line to intrench and to work forward slowly from one position to another.
Examples.
1. The engagement of the 3rd Infantry Division on October 12th,
1904, at Shiliho (battle on the Shaho).[3]
2. The engagement of the 5th Infantry Division, from March 6th to 9th, north of Madiapu (battle of Mukden). This division required three days to work forward from 1100 m. to within assaulting distance of the enemy's position. Cover for men standing upright was constructed at 1100, 950, 530, 390, 300, 200, 160 and 125 m., that under 300 m. being built of sand bags.[4]
3. The combats of the 10th Division on March 3rd and 10th, 1904 (battle of Mukden).[5]
Confidential British instructions dealing with the tactical lessons of the Russo-Japanese war, make the following deductions: "* * * * The above shows the great importance of local reconnaissance by infantry, of which considerably more must be demanded than has been done up
- ↑ von Lüttwitz, Angriffsverfahren der Japaner, p. 24. Sir Ian Hamilton, A Staff Officer's Scrap Book, II. Consult the same work on the unsuccessful pursuing action fought by the 3rd Brigade at the Chosenrei Pass.
- ↑ Von Lüttwitz, Angriffsverfahren der Japaner, p. 47.
- ↑ Ibid., p. 26.
- ↑ Ibid., p. 52. The attack order of the 5th Infantry Division, in Urteile und Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern, I, p. 121.
- ↑ Bronsart von Schellendorff, Beim japanischen Feldheer, pp. 217, et seq, 225, et seq, 242 and 244, et seq. On the use of sand bags, consult ibid., pp. 236 and 292.
