line attacked is exposed to both frontal and oblique fire. The effect of this oblique fire is increased by bending the wing of the attacking line toward the enemy. If the attacking line succeeds in pushing its firing line so far forward that not only the hostile wing but also the hostile flank is struck, an envelopment is brought about with the result that the lines of fire of the assailant cross each other within the hostile position. If the defender refuses a wing, portions of his line may be enfiladed. This will cause such heavy losses that the defender will begin to succumb first at the salient point of his line. A further advantage is gained by a pressure on the enemy's line of retreat.
Pure frontal attacks offer little prospect of success;[1] they may perhaps force the enemy back, but they cannot annihilate him.
For carrying out the attack itself, it is immaterial whether the commander launches it against the hostile front or a hostile flank; individual companies, battalions, and, in large units, regiments, finally make a frontal attack anyway. The fear of the front of the enemy should not lead the enveloping force to attempt to execute another enveloping movement when it encounters a newly formed front. Surprise is, to a certain extent, essential to the success of a flank attack.[2] The troops holding the enemy in front [secondary attack] must, therefore, hold him in such a manner as to keep him in ignorance about the true point of attack, must so engage his attention that he will finally place the bulk of his force into the frontal action. If this does not occur, the opponent will soon distinguish sham from reality and will not oppose a weak, inactive containing
- ↑ It is only necessary to invite attention to the first attacks made by the Prussian Guard against St. Privat, and to the attack made by the 72nd, 40th and 11th Infantry Regiments against the height of Maison Blanche south of Rezonville, on August 16th, 1870. Kunz, Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele, 8-10, p. 128.
- ↑ The attack of the Guard at Chlum (Königgrätz). v. Lettow-Vorbeck, II, p. 474. The assault and capture of the hill of Forbach at Spicheren by six battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps. Gen. St. W., I. p. 356. The assault and capture of the Mont de Brune (Beaumont) by 6-1/2 Prussian companies, which were followed by 4-2/3 companies more. The hill mentioned was defended by 6 battalions and 3 batteries; 6 guns were captured. Hopffgarten-Heidler, Beaumont, pp. 132 and 227.
