2. Toward noon, four fresh companies (1st Battalion, 29th Infantry) were also launched in separate groups;
3. A little later, two fresh companies were put in (9th and 10th Companies, 29th Infantry);
4. At 12:30 P. M., two fresh companies were launched (3rd and 4th Companies, 70th Infantry);
5. A little later, the 10th and 11th Companies, 40th Infantry, were pushed in;
6. About 1:30 P. M., the IInd Battalion, 40th Infantry, was brought up;
7. About 2:30 P. M., the Füsilier Battalion, 70th Infantry, and the 9th and 12th Companies, 40th Infantry, advanced.
Thus, between 11 A. M. and 2:30 P. M., General von Barnekow gradually drew into the fight twenty-five companies, in seven different detachments, from the reserve formed by the 16th Infantry Division at Essigny le Grand. Besides, the troops generally did not appear on the battlefield until the energy of the troops already engaged was exhausted.[1]
Moreover, the retreat of the several detachments was not a voluntary one, for the French, thanks to their great superiority, generally forced them to retire. This engagement thus presents a series of partial successes, which became reverses, however, in a very short time.
Launching reinforcements in driblets increased the numbers required beyond all reasonable bounds, produced heavy losses, and involved the weak reinforcements, which arrived successively, in disaster, without turning the tide of the battle. Decisive victories can only be brought about by simultaneously launching masses.
"The system of close order battalion tactics was no longer practicable under Chassepot fire, and everyone promptly went to the opposite extreme of extended order, company column tactics, with which all were sufficiently familiar, since it had been carefully practiced in minor field exercises in time of peace." (The attack made by the 26th Infantry Brigade against Schlosz Aubigny, August 14th, 1870[2])
There is always danger that unity of action will be sacrificed by the continued assignment of individual tasks; that the leader will not be able to count with confidence on the initiative of subordinate leaders restoring this unity, and "that, in the end, no higher commander will any longer have the assurance that his wishes will be carried out." The battles around Metz during August, 1870, show a tendency on the part of the infantry to
- ↑ Kunz, Nordarmce, II, pp. 135 and 212.
- ↑ Gen. St. W., I, p. 466; von Scherff, Kriegslehren, I, p. 16; von Malachowski, Scharfe Taktik und Revue-Taktik. p. 18. This example is the more instructive, as both advocates of these opposing views show how, in their opinion, the attack should have been made. The same attack is, moreover, treated in Militär-Wochenblatt, 1901, Numbers 41 and 42, under the title Selbständigkeit und Auftragsverfahren.
