supporting points, for others remain on either side; the latter and the second line of supporting points then form a new though somewhat indented defensive line. As the attacking force which has penetrated into the position, is hemmed in on both sides, it will hardly be able to sustain the counter-attack made by the defender's reserves, and its temporary success will turn into defeat. But, in order that this may be accomplished, a second line of supporting points is absolutely essential. Large closed works of high command, but a smaller number than is employed in the first line, are recommended for this purpose. According to Russian opinions, several lines of fortifications are essential in order to check an enemy who has penetrated the first line, and to facilitate the defender's final retreat in case of necessity.
Particular importance is attached to advanced positions, to positions for the reserves, echeloned to the right and left rear of the flanks, and, finally, to rallying positions. Advanced positions are either to serve "reconnaissance purposes," by forcing the enemy to an early deployment, or to do duty as "caponiers" from which a flanking fire may be brought to bear on the foreground.
Advanced positions, doing duty as "caponiers," are invariably to consist of closed works, those serving "reconnaissance purposes" of open works. The latter are to be defended "to the last ditch," and are not to be evacuated until the enemy approaches to about 400 m. or less, but the garrison is not to allow itself to become involved in a bayonet fight.
In contrast with this distribution in depth—2 km., in the model given—Lieutenant-Colonel Jabel, whose views are based on the same experiences, advocates the use of only one line of fortifications. He states: "The length of the battles, which sometimes lasted two weeks, as well as the terrible intensity of fire in general and artillery fire in particular, produced such an absolute nervous exhaustion that the decisive action could be fought only in a single line. With its capture, further fighting had only small prospects of success * * *" "When firing trenches have been constructed at the points where the best effect can be obtained from long and short range fire, they should not be evacuated prematurely, but held, in order to make the most of this fire effect, until the enemy arrives close enough to use his bayonets. If the troops holding the trenches retire immediately before the bayonet fight, their retreat invariably becomes a rout, and, in any case, entails tremendous losses, for, after leaving their trenches, they will be helpless and exposed in the open to the hostile fire."
4. THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE.
In his Tactical Handbook, Major Hoppenstedt suggests a method, well meriting attention, for decreasing the effect of artillery fire on a defensive position. He believes that dummy
