fail to produce an effect. If the enemy does not yield to fire, it is obvious that an assault will have to be made. A counter-attack made unexpectedly is, as a rule, successful at the start; but, if its commander follows up this initial success when not supported by strong reserves, a reverse may take place resulting in the defeat of the defender's entire force.
A counter-attack made by three companies (9th, 10th, and 11th) of
the 3rd Bavarian Infantry Regiment brought relief to the two batteries
which had gone into action near Goury (battle of Loigny). The Ist and
IInd Battalions, 3rd Infantry, the Ist and IInd Battalions, 12th Infantry,
and the 7th Jäger-Battalion joined in this attack, and when the batteries
finally followed, the force succeeded in throwing back the French battalions
immediately opposing it. The twenty-one companies now made the
mistake of attacking Ecuillon, which they occupied. The attacking force
had traversed about 2000 m., and as there were no reserves and flank
echelons, the Bavarians were obliged to give way before an assault made
by seven fresh battalions against their unprotected left flank. The mistake
of pushing forward too far, and the lack of supports in rear of the
exposed flank, was bound to exact a penalty, as soon as the French were
in a position to advance on their own account.[1]
A very instructive episode occurred on August 26th, 1904, near Tsinortun. Toward noon the Japanese Guard and the 10th Division advanced through fields of tall kaoliang for the purpose of enveloping the right wing of the IIIrd Siberian Army Corps. The commanding general, Lieutenant-General Iwanov, directed the reserve (apparently parts of the 3rd East-Siberian Rifle Division) to make a counter-attack against the left flank of the Japanese. The Russian counter-attack was taken in flank by a brigade of the Guard, which followed in rear of the Japanese attacking force, and had to retire. The decision was then brought about by the counter-attack made by the 140th Infantry, which unexpectedly appeared on the left flank of the Japanese. The engagement at Tsinortun is moreover of special interest as regards the Japanese method of attack.[2]
So far we have only considered the counter-attack made
against the flank of an attacker, and against the front of
an enemy who has victoriously penetrated into a position.
The success of a counter-attack against the enemy's flank
depends primarily on moral factors; besides, after protracted
