Case 1:22-cv-01564-BAH Document 21 Filed 04/05/23 Page 10 of 15
court’s analysis of the monkey’s standing to bring a copyright claim was based on its status as a non-human. In determining that only a human has standing under the Act, the court examined statutory provisions involving the term “author” and concluded that they “all imply humanity.” Naruto, 888 F.3d at 426. Indeed, if the term “author” implies humanity in a standing context, it must also imply humanity when used in the context of copyrightability. Plaintiff recognizes as much – acknowledging that identical terms within the same statute bear the same meaning. See Dkt. 18 at 9 (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 478 (1992)).
Finally, Plaintiff’s characterization of Urantia is just simply incorrect. Although the court in Urantia noted the scholarly debate over whether computer-generated works are copyrightable, it did not, as Plaintiff claims, go “out of its way to clarify that its holding did not apply to AI-generated works.” Dkt. 18 at 5. To the contrary, the court explicitly affirmed that there is a “human creativity” requirement for copyrightability. Urantia Found., 114 F.3d at 958.
B. Plaintiff’s Ownership Arguments are Inapplicable to Copyright
The Court should find that the Copyright Office’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious based solely on the arguments above. However, even if Plaintiff were correct that a non-human could create a copyright work—a conclusion not supported by any statute or court opinion—Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he is the proper claimant to register the copyright. Plaintiff’s Opposition and Reply repeats flawed arguments about the works made for hire doctrine. The premise of Plaintiff’s argument is that he is equivalent to an employer of the “Creativity Machine.” See Dkt. 18 at 9–10. But, Plaintiff’s programming, direction, and use of the AI, do not magically anthropomorphize the machine into an employee. Plaintiff cites no cases or other support for the proposition that a computer has ever been treated as an employee under copyright law or common-law agency principles. Id. at 8–9. Further, Plaintiff concedes
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