by having expressed an opinion upon the case. Both men attested complete confidence in their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict upon the evidence to be heard. Calvin could find no cause, under the law, by which he could demand their exclusion from the jury box.
Elmen, having examined for the defense, found no fault. On the contrary, it was plain to Calvin that Elmen desired them for the jury for their very lack of character and intelligence, for their lack of tradition and for their incapacity to understand the need of rigorous enforcement of the law.
Calvin had, as also had Elmen for the defense, twenty peremptory challenges in hand. The law allowed him to reject jurymen peremptorily, up to the number of twenty; that was, he could challenge and dismiss, without other cause than his personal dislike or distrust, any juryman or jurymen up to the number of twenty. Elmen, twenty times, could do the same. When his twenty challenges were exhausted, he no longer could exercise the privilege of personal choice, but must accept any man who legally qualified for jury service.
Obviously, an advantage accrued to the side which could keep its peremptory challenges in hand after the other had exhausted its privileges. Calvin appreciated this and temporarily accepted both jurors and then two more, only to challenge the first pair, peremptorily, and to bring up for examination a young man named Rogers, of actual American birth and education, intelligent and of character. Elmen pretended to be willing to accept him and then dismissed him, peremptorily, and brought up a succession of "-skis, -ovitches and -heims" who, before night, forced the State to expend two more peremptory challenges.
A man named Monroe cost Elmen one challenge, soon
