council is weakened, all the rest shall also be weakened, according to St. Augustine's saying, in the 9th Distinct, capitulo, 'Si ad scripturas.' Then, saith he, both the faith and all other sacraments shall be put in doubt, if there be once any doubt made of the force and power of any council lawfully congregated. There was a decree made in the council of Constance, entitled 'Frequens,' whereby it was ordained that the first council after that, should be holden within five years, and another, within seven years after that again. The council of Constance being ended, and the five years passed, the councils of Pavia and Sienna were holden, after which, seven years being also run over, this council is begun to be celebrated. To what end then is it expressed in the bull of the dissolution, amongst other causes, that the seventh year is already past, when, as of necessity, it ought to be passed before the council can be celebrated? For these words, from seven years or five years, signify, according to the law, that all parts of time should be passed, and the last day looked for. Wherefore it behoved that seven years should be fully complete, before this council of Basil should begin; like as five years were fully expired, before the council of Pavia did begin.
But, peradventure, some man will say, that it ought to have begun the first day after the seventh year was expired; for, otherwise, the term of the council is passed. But hereunto we may answer, that it is not contained in the chapter 'Frequens,' that except it were holden the first day, it should not be holden at all, neither can it be gathered either by the words or meaning. For it is only required that it should be holden after seven years are expired; but, whether it be the second or third day, or the third or four month after the seventh year, it doth satisfy the chapter 'Frequens.' For, when the first day is come, then beginneth the power and liberty to celebrate the council, but not before: but it is not prohibited to celebrate it after; neither doth this word, 'In quinquennium,' that is to say against five years next following, which is alleged in the chapter 'Frequens,' and seemeth to be repeated also for the seven years; for it is not understood that it is necessary to be holden the first day precisely after the seventh year, but because it should not be understood of other seven years to come. For, in speaking simply of seven years, it is understood of seven years next ensuing. Admit also that in the chapter 'Frequens,' any of these words had been joined with these immediately following, as 'by and by,' 'out of hand,' 'immediately,' or 'straightways after,' or such other words: yet ought they to be understood with a certain moderation and distance of time, that is, as soon as might be convenient; as these words are expounded by the lawyers and doctors, for they are enlarged and restrained according to the subject and divers circumstances of the matters and affairs. For it is not by any means likely that it was the mind of those who made the decree, that, considering the long journey and hard preparation of such affairs, and also the manifold impediments which may happen, that they would restrain so precise a time, even at the first day, that if it were not then celebrated, it should not be holden at all; for, by such subtle means, it shoidd also be holden even in the first moment and very instant after, the same year.
But, forasmuch as words are civilly to be understood, this sense or understanding is far too disagreeable. For if any man will say, 'Then it is commanded to be prorogued,' that is also forbidden in the chapter 'Frequens.' He that doth so argue, doth not understand himself nor the force of the words. It is not prorogued, if it be begun the second or third month; but it is rather a continuation or execution of that which is in their power. For, if it were a prorogation, then, forasmuch as a prorogation doth savour of the nature of the first delay, it could not be begun *before the time prorogued: but this happeneth not in our case; for, albeit it were not begun* in the first month, but in the second or third, it is not thereby concluded that it could not be begun in the first: but, if there had been any prorogation made till the second month, then it could not have been begun in the first. As for example, I promise to give a hundred pounds after Easter; before Easter it cannot be required; but, by and by after Easter, it may be required: and, albeit that I be not urged for it, notwithstanding I do not cease to be bound; and, if so be I be demanded it in the second or third month after, it is not thereby understood that there is any prorogation made; neither doth it follow, but that it might have been demanded in the beginning, which could not have been done, if there had been any
